TAFT 

'Rai.i'fc^  ihe  Covenant 


JX1975 

.^.rizs 


Ratify  the  Covenant 


By 


WILLIAM  HOWARD  TAFT 


Ex-Presidmt  of  the  United  States 


This  is  not  a partisan  question.  We  should  he  for  or 
against  the  League  of  Nations  without  regard  to 
whether  we  think  it  will  bring  credit  to  our  party 
or  credit  to  any  man.  Personal  and  partisan  con- 
siderations of  this  kind  are  reasons  which  should 
have  no  influence  with  us  in  determining  an  issue 
so  fateful  in  the  world’s  history  and  so  likely  to 
affect  the  future  welfare  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States  and  of  all  mankind.  The  question  is,  will  the 
League  do  good  for  this  country  or  mankind?  If 
it  will,  let’s  favor  it. 


Published  by 


League  to  Enforce  Peace 
130  West  42d  Street 
New  York 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2017  with  funding  from 
Princeton  Theological  Seminary  Library 


https://archive.org/details/ratifycovenantOOtaft 


Ratify  the  Covenant 

by 

WILLIAM  HOWARD  TAFT 

The  Treaty  of  Peace  that  the  fourteen  powers  have  presented 
to  the  German  representatives  for  their  signature  is  de- 
pendent for  its  execution  upon  the  machinery  provided  by 
the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

If,  and  when,  the  Germans  sign  the  Treaty,  the  President  will 
bring  it  back  home  and  submit  it  to  the  Senate  as  a single  docu- 
ment. The  Constitutional  function  of  the  Senate  is  to  consider  the 
Treaty  and.  to  ratify  or  reject  it.  It  may  ratify  it  conditionally, 
stating  the  conditions  upon  which  it  does  ratify  it.  These  condi- 
tions are  called  amendments  to  the  treaty. 

CHANGES  NOW  WILL  DELAY  PEACE 

The  ratifications,  however,  can  become  absolute  and  effective 
only  upon  the  acceptance  by  other  countries  of  the  amendments 
contained  in  these  conditions.  Treaties  have  been  ratified  with 
reservations  as* to  construction,  which,  not  objected  to  by  other 
nations,  have  created  a binding  treaty ; but  such  reservations  cannot 
be  substantial  amendments  of  the  Treaty,  eliminating  any  article 
or  changing  its  meaning,  without  requiring,  in  order  to  make  a 
binding  treaty,  that  the  other  countries  signing  the  treaty  shall 
consent  formally  to  the  amendments.  It  therefore  follows  that  if 
any  substantial  amendment  is  to  be  made  to  the  treaty  submitted 
by  the  President,  it  must  go  back  to  the  other  Powers  who  signed 
it  for  their  acceptance  and  approval.  This  includes  not  only  all  the 
Allied  Powers  which  formulated  the  treaty,  but  it  includes  Germany 
also.  Upon  those  who  insist  that  substantial  amendments  must  be 
made  to  the  treaty  will  therefore  fall  the  responsibility  for  the 
indefinite  postponement  of  peace  which  the  unconditional  ratifica- 
tion of  the  treaty  will  at  once  bring  about. 

It  has  been  proposed  to  separate  the  Covenant  from  the 
Treaty  and  to  ratify  the  Treaty,  thus  truncated  or  dissected, 
with  the  idea  that  peace  will  follow  such  action  by  the  Senate. 

3 


The  suggestion  has  been  made  that  peace  might  thus  be  reached 
through  a protocol  embodying  the  treaty  and  leaving  the  question 
of  the  League  to  further  consideration.  It  should  be  premised 
that  no  one  can  initiate  peace  except  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  who  is  vested  by  the  Constitution  with  this  power.  No 
one  can  make  a protocol  of  peace  except  the  President.  If,  there- 
fore, the  President  deem  it  essential  that  the  Senate  should  act 
upon  the  Treaty  as  he  submits  it,  there  can  be  no  protocol  as  long 
as  he  maintains  that  attitude,  nor  indeed  could  the  protocol  be  con- 
cluded without  the  consent  of  Germany.  In  other  words,  all  these 
propositions  are  nothing  but  conditional  ratification  on  the  basis  of 
radical  amendments,  and  they  all  will  postpone  indefinitely  the 
coming  of  peace.  Meantime  the  other  great  Powers,  under  the 
terms  of  the  Treaty  as  they  are  now  reported,  can  ratify  the  Treaty 
and  establish  peace  with  Germany  so  far  as  they  are  concerned.  In 
this  way  the  anomalous  condition  will  be  presented  of  a state  of 
war  between  Germany  and  ourselves,  while  peace  prevails  between 
Germany  and  Great  Britain,  Germany  and  PTance,  Germany  and 
Italy,  and  Germany  and  Japan.  This  obviously  disadvantageous 
condition  for  our  industries  and  this  delay  in  the  resumption  of  our 
trade  with  Germany  should  make  the  business  community  of  the 
United  States  scrutinize  with  care  the  reasons  for  substantially 
amending  the  Covenant  or  attempting  to  dissect  it  out  of  the  Treaty. 
Of  course,  if  the  Covenant  exposes  our  country  to  danger  and  risk 
that  we  should  not  assume,  the  consideration  which  we  have  ad- 
vanced should  not  be  allowed  weight  and  the  Treaty  and  the  Cov- 
enant should  be  rejected,  at  whatever  cost  of  inconvenience  or  de- 
lay. But  the  necessary  halt  in  the  coming  of  that  era  of  prosperity 
which  merely  awaits  permanent  peace  and  the  losses  which  it  will 
entail  upon  this  country  require  the  business  men  and  all  others 
to  examine  with  the  closest  scrutiny  and  care  the  arguments  made 
against  the  Covenant  and  its  inclusion  in  the  Treaty. 

MANY  OBJECTIONS  PAR-FETCHED 

There  has  been  much  general  attack  on  the  Treaty,  much  empha- 
sizing of  dangers  which  could  arise  only  in  remote  contingencies 
and  much  straining  of  the  meaning  of  ordinary  words  into  unusual 
and  impossible  significance  in  order  to  sustain  objections  to  the 
Covenant.  There  have  been  far-fetched  prohibitions  to  such  a 
Covenant  found  in  the  Federal  Constitution,  which  judicial  authority 
and  actual  precedent  both  refute.  With  the  result  of  the  rejection 

4 


of  the  Treaty,  or  its  substantial  amendment,  now  clearly  before  the 
country,  these  objections  must  pass  in  closest  review  and  must  be 
clearly  sustained  if  the  inconvenience  and  burden  and  delay  of  re- 
jection or  amendment  are  to  be  justified.  This  is  especially  true  in 
view  of  the  amendment  to  the  Covenant  as  first  reported,  by  which, 
should  we  find  after  ratification  and  actual  operation  of  the  Treaty 
that  any  of  the  criticisms  of  it  were  justified,  we  can  within  two 
years  withdraw  from  further  obligations  of  the  Treaty.  More  than 
that,  there  is  the  power  of  amendment  by  the  unanimous  consent  of 
nine  of  the  powers  whose  representatives  constitute  the  Council  and 
a majority  of  all  the  members  of  the  League,  a means  of  changing 
provisions  which  prove  to  be  burdensome,  which  will  enable  the 
perfecting  of  the  League  as  experience  shall  require. 

A phase  of  the  discussion  of  the  League  has  been  the  tendency 
to  concentrate  it  on  particular  features  or  articles  thought  to  be 
dangerous,  and  to  omit  the  presentation  of  the  general  organization 
of  the  League  and  its  great  and  useful  machinery  for  rendering  war 
improbable  and  making  peace  permanent. 

I shall  begin,  therefore,  with  the  four  great  steps  taken  in  the 
League  to  achieve  this  purpose,  and  show  its  value  to  the  world 
and  to  us  to  be  so  capital  that  we  ought  to  allow  no  minor  objection 
or  doubt  to  deprive  us  of  their  inestimable  benefits.  The  Covenant 
does  not  create  a supersovereign.  It  delegates  to  no  managing  com- 
mittee or  body  the  power  to  act  for  members  of  the  League.  It  is 
not  that  kind  of  League,  however  effective  such  a League  might 
be.  The  Covenant  is  an  agreement  for  co-operation  by  members 
of  the  League  to  achieve  its  purpose.  The  members  are  them- 
selves to  act  and  to  delegate  to  no  other  body  the  power  to  act  for 
them.  They  are  to  act  through  their  constitutional  agencies.  With 
us,  if  a boycott  is  to  be  levied,  it  is  for  Congress  to  decide  whether 
this  obligation  has  arisen  under  the  Treaty  and  Covenant,  and  then 
to  levy  the  necessary  embargo.  If  military  forces  are  to  be  used, 
it  is  for  Congress  to  determine  whether  they  are  to  be  so  used,  and 
to  authorize  their  obligations  and  use.  If  armament  is  to  be  limited, 
it  is  for  the  treaty-making  power,  or  Congress,  to  consent  to  the 
limit  and  for  Congress  to  keep  within  it. 

COUNCIL  AND  ASSEMBLY 

There  are  two  bodies  provided  for  in  the  organization  of  the 
League.  One  is  the  Council  of  nine  members,  five  of  them  to  be 
representatives  of  the  five  great  powers,  the  United  States,  the 

5 


British  Empire,  France,  Italy  and  Japan,  and  four  of  them  to  repre- 
sent four  other  powers  selected  by  the  Assembly.  The  Assembly 
consists  of  representatives  of  all  the  members  of  the  League.  Each 
country  may  have  from  one  to  three  delegates,  and  can  only  cast 
one  vote.  The  function  of  the  Council  is  advisory  and  recom- 
mendatory in  respect  to  all  the  functions  of  the  League.  It  is  the 
agency  through  which  members  of  the  League  are  advised  of  the 
state  of  affairs,  and  through  which  they  can  agree  upon  a plan  of 
co-operation.  It  is  a more  active  body  than  the  Assembly  and  meets 
more  frequently,  and  has  many  more  duties.  One  of  them  is  to  act 
as  a mediatory  body  when  the  parties  do  not  agree  upon  arbitration. 
The  Assembly,  by  a two-thirds  vote,  can  admit  new  members  to 
fulfil  certain  conditions.  If  either  party  desires,  it  can  be  substi- 
tuted as  a mediating  body  for  the  Council.  It  also  has  the  func- 
tion of  pointing  out  inconsistencies  between  existing  treaties  of 
League  members  and  their  obligations  under  the  League. 

ARMAMENT  RACE  FOSTERED  WAR 

The  first  of  the  four  great  steps  taken  by  the  League  during  the 
maintenance  of  peace  is  the  limitation  of  armament  provided  for  in 
the  eighth  article.  The  Council  is  to  consider  all  world  armaments, 
and  with  the  aid  of  a military  commission  is  to  determine  a plan  for 
a general  reduction  of  armaments  and  fix  the  limit  for  each  nation 
member  of  the  League  in  that  plan.  The  plan  is  then  submitted  to 
the  several  nations  for  discussion  and  agreement.  When  the  nations 
have  agreed  to  a plan,  or  to  such  amendments  of  it  as  they  require, 
they  covenant  to  keep  within  the  limit  fixed  and  agreed  upon  for  a 
period  of  ten  years  unless  the  Council  increases  the  limit  in  view 
of  changed  conditions. 

The  importance  of  this  provision  cannot  be  overstated  in  securing 
peace.  The  chief  factor  in  bringing  the  world  into  this  great  war 
was  the  race  of  competitive  armaments  between  the  nations.  After 
the  wars  of  Prussia  with  Denmark,  Austria  and  France,  a German 
Empire  was  formed  by  Bismarck  on  a policy  of  blood  and  iron  and 
an  elaborate  system  of  conscription  of  all  the  youth  of  Germany, 
with  great  effort,  expense  and  preparation  for  war,  in  strategic 
railways,  small  arms,  ammunition,  and  all  possible  military  equip- 
ment, was  entered  upon.  Not  only  that,  but  Germany  stimulated 
her  allies,  Austria  and  Italy,  to  a similar  course.  For  national  safety 
France  and  Russia  were  compelled  to  enter  into  their  great  plans 

6 


of  conscription  and  military  preparation  to  defend  themselves 
against  the  possible  aggression  of  Germany  and  the  threat  of  her 
armament.  Later  on,  there  was  a similar  race  between  Germany 
and  Great  Britain  in  naval  matters.  Such  enormous  armaments 
had  four  evil  results.  One  was  the  burdensome  taxation  upon  the 
peoples  engaged.  The  second  was  the  removal  from  the  fields  of 
production,  for  two  or  three  years,  by  conscription,  of  all  the  young 
men  of  the  country.  The  third  was  the  truculence  and  temptation 
to  war  which  the  possession  3f  such  a powerful  instrument  gave  to 
the  Kaiser.  He  used  it  in  seeking  diplomatic  triumphs  in  the  Con- 
gresses of  Nations,  explaining  them  by  the  declaration  that  he  had 
won  them  by  standing  forth  “in  his  shining  armor,”  or  “by  rattling 
the  sword  in  his  scabbard.”  Undoubtedly,  the  fact  that  Germany 
was  ahead  in  the  race  of  armament,  that  Russia  was  slow  in  the 
execution  of  its  plan  for  strategic  railways,  and  France  had  not 
perfected  its  new  purpose  in  respect  to  artillery  and  conscription 
led  Germany  to  accept  the  Austrian-Serbian  difficulty  as  the  occa- 
sion for  the  use  of  its  perfect  military  establishment  to  realize  its 
dreams  of  empire.  Without  its  success  in  the  race  of  armament, 
it  never  would  have  conceived  such  dreams.  In  this  sense,  there- 
fore, this  race  of  armament  caused  the  war.  The  fifth  great  evil 
from  this  competitive  system  was  the  enormous  destructiveness  of 
the  war  and  the  savage  character  which  this  German  preparation 
gave  it.  It  was  a war  of  the  German  people  against  other  peoples. 
It  was  a war  in  which  the  extensive  scope  of  the  German  people’s 
weapons  included  non-combatants — men,  women  and  children — in 
its  bloody  purpose,  and  in  which  the  permanent  devastation  of 
countries,  with  the  ulterior  object  of  the  successful  industrial  and 
commercial  advantage  of  the  Conqueror,  was  clear.  When  such 
suffering,  such  immense  loss  of  life,  such  world-wide  disaster  have 
grown  out  of  this  race  of  armament,  are  we  not  justified  in  assuming 
any  burden  and  restriction  to  prevent  its  inevitable  recurrence? 

LIMITATION  BY  FORCE  AND  AGREEMENT 

How  are  we  to  limit  it?  We  limit  it,  in  the  case  of  Germany, 
by  compulsion — by  compulsion  of  a League  of  Nations.  Those 
nations  which  dictated  the  peace  must  unite  to  maintain  it.  The 
only  way  we  can  limit  it  among  the  Allies  is  by  agreement,  and  it 
is  that  agreement  which  Article  VIII  in  the  League  provides  for. 

7 


What  is  the  objection?  It  is  said  that  if  we  limit  our  armament 
we  paralyze  our  government  in  its  defense  of  our  liberties  and  our 
institutions  against  external  aggression,  and  we  expose  ourselves 
“naked  to  our  enemies.”  The  objection  is  entirely  without  weight. 
We  limit  our  armament  in  consideration  of  the  nations  of  the 
League  limiting  theirs.  Our  limit  is  adjusted  proportionately  to 
theirs,  having  due  regard  to  the  more  or  less  exposed  position  of 
each  nation,  its  obligations  to  the  League  and  its  need  for  domestic 
use  of  armament. 

Secondly,  if  other  nations  can  safely  agree  to  disarm,  cannot  we? 
We  have  an  ocean  between  us  and  Europe  where  the  greatest  danger 
of  disturbance  is,  and  we  have  an  ocean  between  us  and  Asia.  If 
France  and  Great  Britain  and  Italy,  with  their  recent  enemies  just 
across  the  border  from  them,  can  agree  to  limit  armament,  why 
cannot  we? 

Again,  is  it  not  rather  absurd  and  humorous  for  us  to  be  so  sensi- 
tive now  in  respect  to  the  proportionate  reduction  of  the  armament 
under  the  general  plan,  when  never  in  the  history  of  the  coimtry 
have  we  had  an  adequate  armament  at  the  beginning  of  any  war 
or  until  we  could  make  hasty  preparation  for  that  war?  1 venture 
to  prophesy  that  if  the  League  is  ratified  and  the  agreement  to  dis- 
arm is  made,  and  the  limit  fixed  for  us,  we  shall  never  reach  that 
limit  until  war  is  on  us  and  that  the  limit  imposed  will  not  constitute 
the  slightest  embarrassment  to  Congress. 

Again,  the  Emperor  of  Russia  summoned  a conference  at  The 
Hague,  and  one  of  the  chief  purposes  of  that  congress  was  to  secure 
a mutual  and  common  limitation  of  armament  among  the  nations  of 
the  world,  and  it  was  prevented  by  the  obdurate  refusal  of  Ger- 
many to  give  the  slightest  support  to  such  a proposal.  Our  own 
delegates  were  instructed  to  press  in  favor  of  it.  The  public 
opinion  of  this  country  undoubtedly  supported  that  instruction. 
Now  these  objectors  propose  that  we  shall  take  the  place  of  Ger- 
many by  our  refusal  to  join  in  a common  limit  of  armament,  and 
so  defeat  the  purposes  of  the  League. 

INVOLVES  FAMILIAR  PRINCIPLES 

It  is  further  objected  that  an  agreement  to  limit  armament  in  a 
treaty  on  our  part  is  unconstitutional.  The  treaty-making  power 
has  been  held  by  the  Supreme  Court  to  include  that  of  making  any 
contract  for  our  nation  with  another  relating  to  any  subject  matter 

8 


A^hich  is  usually  included  in  treaties  between  nations,  save  only 
that  we  may  not  change  the  form  of  our  government  or  cede  land 
of  a State  without  its  consent.  The  limitation  of  armament  is  one 
of  frequent  occurrence  in  peace  treaties,  and  has  always  been. 
Therefore,  it  comes  within  the  definition  of  the  Supreme  Court  as 
a subject  matter  proper  for  contract  by  our  treaty-making  power. 

More  than  this,  we  made  such  a treaty  with  Great  Britain  more 
than  one  hundred  years  ago,  in  which  we  agreed  to  limit  our  naval 
armament  on  the  Great  Lakes  in  consideration  of  her  doing  the 
same  thing,  and  we  have  kept  that  treaty  alive  and  maintained  it 
for  more  than  a century.  It  was  not  thought  to  be  unconstitutional 
then ; its  validity  has  not  been  questioned  during  that  one  hundred 
years  of  its  life;  and  we  have  all  been  proud  of  the  fact  that  we 
made  it  and  kept  it.  Certainly,  if  authority  and  precedent  can 
establish  constitutional  validity,  they  do  so  in  this  case. 

If  it  be  objected  that  the  Council  may  increase  the  limit  of  arma- 
ment needed  in  the  ten  years,  and  that  therefore  it  leave  it  to  an 
outside  authority  to  govern  our  course  m this  respect,  it  is  sufficient 
to  answer  that  as  we  have  the  full  authority  to  make  an  agreement 
for  ten  years,  the  mere  fact  that  the  agreement  may  be  made  less 
stringent  by  the  action  of  the  Council  during  that  ten  years  cannot 
invalidate  the  agreement.  As  the  council  must  act  unanimously,  no 
change  can  be  made  in  varying  the  proportion  between  armaments 
unless  by  the  consent  of  our  representative  in  that  council;  and 
therefore  by  our  own  consent.  So  much  for  the  first  step  in  the 
Covenant. 

ARTICLE  X — HEART  OF  THE  LEAGUE 

The  second  great  step  forward  involved  in  this  League  of  Na- 
tions is  Article  X,  by  which  the  members  of  the  League  undertake 
to  respect  and  preserve  the  territorial  integrity  and  the  political 
independence  of  all  its  members.  This  in  effect  is  an  organization 
of  the  united  power  of  the  nations  of  the  League  to  maintain  and 
preserve  an  international  commandment,  “Thou  shall  not  steal.” 
It  is  the  union  of  the  nations  to  suppress  the  spirit  of  conquest 
which  led  Germany  to  drag  this  world  into  the  awful  war  through 
which  it  has  just  passed.  It  is  the  effective  answer  of  the  nations 
to  the  German  declaration  of  principle  that  “Might  makes  right” 
It  is  the  protection  of  the  smaller  nations  against  the  spoliation  of 

9 


them  by  the  larger  and  more  powerful  nations.  It  is  the  heart  of 
the  League  and  it  is  the  effort  of  the  world  of  law-abiding  nations 
to  defeat  forever  the  greedy  purposes  of  militarism,  whether  of 
Germany  or  any  other  nation. 

It  is  said  that  this  will  involve  the  United  States  in  wars  to  pro- 
tect nations  in  distant  parts  of  the  world  in  whose  welfare  we  have 
no  interest,  and  will  call  for  an  expenditure  of  money  and  the  lives 
of  our  boys  in  which  we  ought  not  to  involve  our  country.  This 
is  not  true.  The  effect  of  the  organization  of  the  League,  vidth  the 
threat  against  any  nation  who  should  violate  Article  X and  attempt 
a war  of  conquest  against  another  nation,  will  be  to  restrain  that 
nation  and  prevent  its  beginning  war.  The  knowledge  that  there 
would  be  visited  upon  it  the  overwhelming  power  of  the  united 
nations,  first  by  a universal  isolation,  and,  second,  by  united  military 
forces,  will  render  such  wars  most  improbable.  We  employ  a 
police  force  not  because  the  members  of  that  force  are  constantly 
engaged  in  clubbing  men  who  violate  the  law,  but  because  their 
presence  restrains  the  men  who  wish  to  violate  the  law.  The  very 
organization  of  the  League,  with  the  force  behind  it,  is  the  restrain- 
ing influence  that  will  prevent  war.  Only  in  infrequent  cases  will 
war  result.  Take  a well-known  instance.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  is 
nearly  a century  old.  It  notified  the  world  that  we  would  resist  by 
force  any  European  nation  violating  Article  X against  any  Amer- 
ican nation.  American  statesmen  there  were  who  said  it  would 
involve  us  in  constant  war,  yet  for  a century  we  have  maintained 
the  doctrine  without  firing  a shot  or  losing  a man.  No  European 
nation,  when  greed  for  colonies  was  rife,  cared  to  engage  in  any 
war  with  us  in  an  attempt  to  conquer  an  American  State  and  gain 
a colony  in  this  hemisphere, 

WEAK  NATIONS  CHIEF  BENEFICIARIES 

Under  the  recommendations  of  the  Council,  which  is  to  act 
unanimously,  and  in  which  we  have  a representation,  we  can  be 
sure  that  our  activities  will  be  called  for  only  under  a reasonable 
plan  for  distributing  the  burden  of  united  action  under  Article  X. 

It  has  been  suggested  that  this  Article  X is  in  the  interest  of 
Great  Britain,  with  her  far-flung  empire,  to  preserve  her  territorial 
integrity  through  the  aid  of  the  United  States  and  other  countries. 
There  is  no  foundation  for  such  a suggestion.  Can  any  one  point 
out  in  the  history  of  the  last  fifty  years  any  war  against  Great 

10 


Britain  to  take  away  territory  from  her  by  a foreign  country?^ No,' 
war  of  that  sort  is  not  originally  begun  against  a nation  as  powerful 
as  Great  Britain.  Wars  are  begun  as  Austria  began  her  war  against 
Serbia,  because  Serbia  was  a weak  nation  and  Austria  a strong  one ; 
and  this  guaranty  is  in  the  interest  of  the  weaker  nations  whom 
it  is  to  our  benefit  to  protect  against  a war  of  conquest  that  will 
ultimately  involve  the  world  as  the  attack  upon  Serbia  did. 

Another  objection  made  to  this  article  is  that  if  Ireland  were  to 
rebel  against  England  and  seek  to  establish  herself  as  an  inde- 
pendent republic,  England  could  invite,  under  this  Article  X,  the 
other  nations  of  the  world  to  assist  her  in  suppressing  this  rebellion 
or  revolution.  This  is  utterly  unfounded,  because  Article  X is  only 
an  understanding  to  preserve  territorial  integrity  and  political  inde- 
pendence against  external  aggression.  Nations  must  take  care  of 
their  own  revolutions,  and  if  their  conduct  o£  Government  is  such 
that  revolutions  occur  and  new  nations  are  established  out  of  the 
old  ones,  there  is  nothing  in  Article  X to  prevent. 

PEACEABLE  SETTLEMENT 

The  third  great  step  forward  in  the  League  is  to  be  found  in 
Article  XII  and  the  following,  in  which  provision  is  made  for  the 
peaceful  settling  of  differences  between  members  of  the  League  by 
arbitration  or  by  mediation,  through  the  Council  or  the  Assembly, 
and  a covenant  of  the  nations  not  to  begin  war  until  after  the 
machinery  for  settling  differences  peaceably  shall  have  been  tried 
and  failed  and  until  three  months  after  an  award  by  arbitration  or 
a unanimous  report  of  recommendation  of  settlement  by  the 
mediating  body,  which  is  the  Council  or  the  Assembly,  and  a failure 
to  comply  with  either.  In  other  words,  the  differences  are  to  be 
heard,  evidence  is  to  be  taken,  arguments  are  to  be  made,  and  more 
than  a year  is  to  be  taken  up  in  the  discussion  and  decision,  in  pos- 
sessing each  side  of  the  attitude  of  the  other,  and  in  bringing  the 
parties  together  for  conference  to  see  if  some  agreement  cannot  be 
reached.  All  of  this  is  likely  to  result  in  a peaceable  settlement  of 
most  differences,  influenced  by  public  opinion  of  the  world,  as  evi- 
denced by  the  action  of  the  Assembly.  If  any  nation  begins  war, 
in  violation  of  this  Covenant  to  await  the  peaceable  settlement  of 
differences,  as  above,  then  the  penalizing  article  applies,  and  all 
the  members  of  the  League  are  bound  to  initiate  at  once  a universal 
boycott  against  the  outlaw  nation,  a boycott  that  will  cut  off  all 

11 


Commercial  and  trade  relations  with  the  world,  all  personal  rela- 
tions, all  diplomatic  relations  with  other  nations;  a boycott  that 
will  hold  up  food  and  raw  material  from  the  recalcitrant  nation, 
will  prevent  its  selling  its  products  in  foreign  market,  will  hold  up 
the  payment  of  the  debts  due  it,  and  will  in  every  way  impose  upon 
it  a withering  isolation  that  will  be  nearly  as  destructive  as  war.  If 
that  does  not  do,  then  provision  is  made  by  recommendation  of  the 
Council  for  a military  expedition  by  the  members  of  the  League  to 
add  to  the  economic  pressure  of  the  boycott  the  military  force. 
This  is  not  a war-proof  machine.  It  may  not  exclude  the  possi- 
bility of  war,  but  it  will  render  it  so  remote  that  the  progress  made 
by  it  towards  permanent  peace  is  of  the  most  substantial  character. 

The  same  objections  are  made  to  this  step  as  to  that  of  Article  X, 
that  it  will  involve  us  in  trouble  with  remote  nations,  and  possible 
wars.  There  is  the  same  answer,  namely,  that  the  knowledge  of  this 
union  of  the  nations  to  enforce  this  obligation  of  the  League  will 
prevent  its  violation  by  reckless  members.  For  the  same  purpose 
there  is  a provision  in  the  League  that  where  difficulties  arise  be- 
tween members  of  the  League  and  non-members,  or  between  non- 
members (because  the  League  asserts  its  interests  in  all  wars  of 
international  character)  by  which  the  Council  is  authorized  to  sum- 
mon any  non-member  having  a difference  with  a member  of  the 
League,  or  any  two  non-members  having  differences  between  them, 
and  invite  them,  for  the  purpose  of  settling  the  differences  peace- 
ably, to  become  temporary  members  of  the  League  and  thus  to 
impose  on  them  the  obligations  of  the  League  and  impose  on  them, 
if  they  violate  such  obligation,  the  penalties  provided  in  Article 
XVI.  In  this  way  the  whole  world  is  reached  and  brought  under 
the  obligations  of  the  League  to  prevent  war. 

OPEN  DIPLOMACY 

The  fourth  great  step  forward  is  that  compelling  open  diplomacy. 
All  treaties  made  between  nations  are  to  conform  to  the  obligations 
of  the  members  of  the  League,  and  future  treaties  are  not  to  have 
effect  until  they  have  been  recorded  in  the  Secretariat  of  the  League. 
In  this  way  the  cards  are  to  be  played  face  up  on  the  table.  There 
are  to  be  no  secret  agreements  between  nations,  but  each  nation  is 
to  know  what  the  obligation  of  other  nations  is.  Secret  treaties, 
secret  ententes,  have  in  the  past  been  fruitful  of  wars  and  inter- 
national injustice.  They  are  thus  to  be  abolished. 

12 


With  these  four  great  steps  secured  by  mutual  covenants  we  have 
a right  to  say  that  immense  progress  will  be  made  toward  the  pre- 
servation of  permanent  peace  and  the  avoidance  of  the  scourge  of 
war.  If  we  have  another  general  war,  as  we  are  likely  to  have 
unless  we  have  a League,  not  now  but  in  ten  years  or  in  twenty 
years,  it  will  be  as  much  more  destructive  than  this  war  as  this  war 
was  more  destructive  than  the  last  war.  We  went  into  this  war 
because  we  wished  to  end  German  militarism  and  because  we  feared 
that  if  German  militarism  prevailed  in  this  war,  Germany  would 
dominate  the  world  and  would  curtail  world  independence  and 
world  freedom  of  nations.  In  the  course  of  ten  or  twenty  years, 
with  the  inevitable  competition  in  armament  which  will  follow  the 
absence  of  a League  of  Nations,  there  will  be  a repetition  of  the 
conditions  which  led  to  this  war,  and  then  the  increased  destructive- 
ness of  the  next  war  into  which  we  shall  certainly  be  drawn  as  we 
were  into  this,  will  bring  about  something  equivalent  to  world 
suicide.  There  is,  therefore,  the  heaviest  obligation  on  us,  as  the 
most  powerful  nation  in  the  world,  both  in  our  own  interests  and  in 
that  of  the  world,  to  unite  in  this  League  of  Nations  and  give  it 
strength  and  effectiveness,  which  it  cannot  have  unless  we  join  it. 
We  are  the  most  disinterested  nation  entering  it,  and  the  fact  that 
we  are  so,  the  fact  that  we  represent  pure  democracy,  will  give  the 
League  the  prestige  and  confidence  of  the  world  that  it  might  not 
otherwise  have.  The  knowledge  by  the  world  that  we  are  in  the 
League  and  that  our  power  is  united  with  that  of  all  the  others 
will  have  a moral  effect  to  prevent  war,  the  value  of  which  cannot 
be  overestimated. 

LEAGUE  FIRST  PEACE  REQUISITE 

Criticisms  have  been  made  of  this  league  of  various  kinds.  These 
criticisms  have  led  to  suggestions  for  amendments  and  the  amend- 
ments upon  which  most  friends  of  the  League  have  agreed  have 
now  been  adopted.  Therefore,  we  may  well  hope  that  many  of  the 
Senators  who  announced  in  so-called  “Round  Robins”  that  the 
League  as  reported  was  not  acceptable  will  ultimately  acquiesce  in 
the  amended  League.  They  asked  that  the  League  be  postponed 
until  after  the  peace  treaty  imposing  terms  upon  Germany  should  be 
signed.  The  difficulty  about  that  proposition  was  that  in  the  present 
condition  of  Europe  no  peace  treaty  would  be  effective  unless  the 
nations  dictating  this  peace  to  Germany  shall  themselves  constitute 

13 


a League  of  Nations.  That  required  that  the  League  of  Nations 
should  be  inserted  in  the  Peace  Treaty,  where  it  has  been  put. 

It  is  easy  to  see  why  this  is  necessary.  Under  the  terms  of 
peace  to  be  meted  out  to  Germany  the  principle  of  self-determina- 
tion of  racial  units  has  been  followed,  and  some  eighteen  or  twenty 
independent  States  are  to  be  created  where  there  were  but  four 
empires  before.  Seven  of  them  are  to  be  republics  and  the  others 
are  put  under  autonomous  governments,  which  are  mandataries  or 
agents  of  the  League.  The  peace  treaty  determining  the  rights  of 
these  numerous  new  and  old  states  in  the  sphere  of  war  is  long  and 
complicated.  Differences  in  construction  and  in  claims  of  the  vari- 
ous nations  must  arise.  There  must  be  some  method  of  peaceable 
settlement  through  the  instrumentalities  of  the  League,  and  then 
such  settlement  must  be  enforced  by  the  power  of  the  League.  The 
treaty  cannot  enforce  itself  in  the  face  of  an  unrepentant  Germany. 

OUR  OBLIGATIONS  NOT  ENDED 

We  are  not  a slacker  nation  and  we  don’t  intend  to  be.  We  helped 
fight  this  war.  Our  allies  had  been  fighting  for  three  years  before 
us — before  we  joined  the*  war.  Then  we  came  in  and  helped  them 
win  it.  Our  intervention  was  necessary  to  win  the  war,  but  our 
obligation  to  our  allies  for  what  they  did  for  us  continues,  and  it 
will  be  a weak  and  disloyal  policy  on  our  part  if,  just  when  it  was 
necessary  to  reap  the  fruits  of  the  sacrifices  and  efforts  of  all  the 
nations,  we  withdrew  and  made  to  fail,  by  our  withdrawal,  the 
clinching  of  the  purposes  of  war. 

There  is  no  transfer  of  sovereignty  under  this  League  to  the 
Council  or  the  Assembly.  The  Council  only  recommends  and  pro- 
poses and  advises.  It  does  not  command  or  direct  or  order.  The 
chief  attacks  upon  the  League  rest  entirely  on  the  claim  that  the 
word  “recommend”  means  to  “■command,”  and  that  the  word  “ad- 
vise” means  to  “direct,”  and  that  the  word  “propose”  means  to 
“order.”  This  is  an  utterly  unwarranted  and  strained  construction 
of  the  League  which  every  fair-minded  man  should  see.  The  ob- 
ligations of  the  United  States  and  the  other  nations  under  the 
League  itself  are  not  fixed  by  the  Council.  They  are  created  by  the 
words  of  the  League  and  they  are  to  be  discharged  and  performed 
by  Congress,  the  constitutional  agent  of  the  United  States  in  meet- 
ing its  obligations  under  treaties.  Congress  has  the  power  to  dis- 
honor such  obligations,  but  it  is  a dishonorable  course  for  Congress 

14 


to  .pursue.  The  treaty-making  power  permits  the  entering  into  such 
obligations.  We  have  done  it  before.  We  have  agreed  to  make  war 
and  we  have  agreed  not  to  make  war,  in  treaties.  We  have  agreed 
to  limit  our  armament  in  treaties,  one  of  which  has  lasted  for  one 
hundred  years,  in  respect  to  our  armament  upon  the  Great  Lakes 
between  us  and  Canada.  If  we  levy  a boycott,  it  is  for  Congress 
to  levy  it  and  to  determine  that  the  necessity  has  arisen  for  levying 
the  boycott  under  the  obligations  of  the  League.  In  other  words, 
there  is  no  change  in  the  form  of  our  Government  by  reason  of  our 
performing  the  obligations  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

TRUTH  BETWEEN  EXTREMES  OF  CRITICISM 

In  the  opposition  to  the  League,  we  find  this  curious  difference 
among  the  bitterest  of  critics.  One  class  insists  that  it  creates  a 
super-sovereignty  and  an  oligarchy  which  will  control  our  inter- 
national relationships  and  will  really  deprive  us  of  sovereignty.  The 
other  class,  with  equal  persistence,  decries  the  League  as  absolutely 
worthless  in  the  cause  of  peace,  because  it  is  said  to  be  without  teeth 
and  has  no  governing  body  necessary  to  secure  from  it  prompt  and 
effective  action.  The  truth  lies  between.  It  has  no  managing  body 
to  which  the  nations  delegate  their  powers,  but  it  is  a mistake  to 
say  that  it  is  without  teeth.  It  depends  for  its  success  and  useful- 
ness in  the  cause  of  peace,  upon  the  spirit  of  co-operation,  to  which 
the  nations  pledge  themselves  by  the  terms  of  the  League.  If  they 
maintain  this  spirit  of  co-operation, the  League  must  be  most  effective. 
This  will  be  true  though  a few  of  the  nations  fail,  if  only  the  great 
majority  of  them  in  good  faith  perform  their  obligations  and  mani- 
fest a sense  of  responsibility  in  aiding  the  declared  purpose  of  the 
League.  Should  we  find  the  necessary  spirit  of  co-operation  lacking, 
so  as  to  make  the  League  ineffective,  then  we  can  withdraw  from 
it  on  two  years’  notice.  The  objects  of  the  League,  however,  are 
so  valuable  to  all  the  nations,  and  the  necessity  for  its  existence 
has  been  so  impressed  on  every  country  by  the  lessons  of  the  war 
as  to  justify  confidence  that  the  nations  will  stand  together  in 
their  support  of  the  League,  as  they  are  bound  in  honor  to  do. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  specifically  recognized  by  all  nations  as 
a regional  understanding  in  the  constitution  of  the  League  by  a 
provision  that  nothing  in  the  League  shall  affect  it.  This  is  the  first 
time  in  the  history  of  the  Doctrine  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has 
been  recognized  by  the  world  as  a customary  convention.  It  is  a 
great  achievement  for  us. 


15 


OF  COURSE  SOME  BURDENS 

Of  course  we  shall  have  to  meet  obligations  under  this  League. 
Of  course  there  will  be  some  burden  connected  with  it.  A League 
of  Nations  means  something  that  binds  nations  to  do  something  to 
accomplish  a common  purpose.  We  cannot  hope  by  united  power 
to  accomplish  a common  purpose  unless  each  member  contributes 
its  share  to  the  means  by  which  that  purpose  is  to  be  effected. 
There  are  those  who  say  they  are  in  favor  of  a Leagpae  but  not  in 
favor  of  this  League,  because  it  has  obligations.  That  means  that 
they  are  not  in  favor  of  any  League  at  all.  It  means  that  they  are 
in  favor  of  something  that  binds  other  nations  and  does  not  bind 
us  to  our  share  of  the  work  needed  to  accomplish  the  purpose  of 
the  League.  What  we  are  to  do  by  the  League  is  by  a stitch  in 
time  to  save  nine,  by  assuming  comparatively  slight  obligations  to 
protect  us  against  the  heavy,  burdensome  and  destructive  obliga- 
tions involved  in  competitive  armament  and  another  general  war, 
and  to  secure  to  us  and  to  the  world  the  blessings  of  permanent 
peace. 

This  is  not  a partisan  question.  We  should  be  for  or  against  the 
League  without  respect  to  whether  we  are  Democrats  or  Republi- 
cans. We  should  be  for  or  against  the  League  without  regard  to 
whether  we  think  it  will  bring  credit  to  our  party  or  credit  to  any 
man.  Personal  and  partisan  considerations  of  this  kind  are  reasons 
which  should  have  no  influence  with  us  in  determining  an  issue  so 
fateful  in  the  world’s  history  and  so  likely  to  affect  the  future  wel- 
fare of  the  people  of  the  United  States  and  of  all  mankind.  When, 
therefore,  you  come  to  consider  the  question  whether  you  are  in 
favor  of  the  treaty  or  not,  you  should  search  your  hearts  and  souls 
and  your  consciences  to  see  whether  you  are  approaching  it  in  the 
proper  patriotic  and  humane  spirit,  or  whether  you  are  against  it 
because  Mr.  Wilson  is  for  it  and  you  may  fear  that  he  will  gain 
credit  for  its  adoption,  or  because  you  may  suppose  that  his  party 
may  gain  party  credit  for  it.  These  are  small  reasons  for  support- 
ing or  opposing  the  League.  The  question  is,  will  it  do  good  for 
this  country  or  mankind?  If  it  will,  let  us  favor  it.  If  it  endangers 
our  country  or  interferes  with  mankind,  let  us  oppose  it,  but  let  us 
base  our  action  and  our  view  on  high  and  patriotic  reasons.  When 
we  approach  the  question  of  the  League  of  Nations  from  that  stand- 
point, I do  not  doubt  that  the  great  majority  of  the  people  of  the 
United  States  and  the  needed  majority  of  the  Senators  of  the 
United  States  will  approve  this  League. 

16 


PHOTOMOUNT 

PAMPHLET  BINDER  * 

PAT.  NO. 
677188 

Manufactured  hu 
GAYLORD  BROS.  Ine. 
Syracuse,  N.  Y. 
Stockton,  Calif. 


